Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972

Automotive Products Corporation v. Provo City Corporation : Brief
of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.A. Dan Jeffs; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Automotive Products v. Provo City, No. 12790 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5592

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12790

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
DefendBnt and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the Foa.rth District Coa.rt tor
Utah County, The Honorable George E. Ballif

GLEN J. ELLIS, Esquire
l 7 South Universtiy
Provo, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

A. DEAN JEFFS of
JEFFS AND JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah

F llt,,MAY 2 2197l

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE ........................................................ I
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT...... 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ....................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS····························--······
2
STATEMENT OF POINTS ................................ IO
ARGUMENT ............................................................ I I
POINT I .............................................................. I I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
HELD THAT PROVO CITY TOOK RESPONDENT'S LAND IN I967 'VHEN
THE CITY ACTUALLY BEGAN WORK
FACING AND PHYSICALLY WIDENED THE STREET.
POINT II ............................................................ I7
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
HELD THAT RESPONDENT'S LAND
WAS APPROPRIATED BY PROVO
CITY AND THAT RESPONDENT HAD
NOT DEDICATED ITS LAND TO THE
PUBLIC USE.
1

Page
POINT III .......................................................... 23
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW THE CITY AN
OFFSET AGAINST THE VALUE OF
THE LAND TAKEN FOR SPECIAL
BENEFITS CONFERRED ON THE
BALANCE OF THE PROPERTY BECAUSE: (1) THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SPECIAL BENEFITS;
AND (2) IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY
SPECIAL BENEFITS, SUCH BENEFITS COULD BE OFFSET ONLY
AGAINST SEVERANCE DAMAGES
AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF
SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 29

CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
UTAH CONSTITUTION:
Article I, Section 22 .................................. 16, 25, 29

UTAH STATUTES:
10-9-23 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
,
as amended
..................................................... ·······13
27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ................ 19
78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

as amended ........................................................ 23, 26
Rule 8 ( c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ........ 29
11

1

REFERENCE WORKS:

Page

27
urisprudence 2d, Eminent
Domam, Section 478 -------------------------------------------- 16
58 American Law Reports, Annotated,
18
Section 240 -----··-····-·---·-----·····-·-·-----·--·--·-·-··--········American Law of Zoning, Anderson, Bancroft & Whitney, San Francisco ( 1968) ---·-·--·--- 14
"The Law of Eminent Domain," Utah State
Attorney General Handbook, Salt Lake City··-- 24
Just Compensation, Revised, Kaltenback,
Right of Way Consultants, Inc., Warrenton,
Va., ( 1964) ---··--------------·--·-----·--·--·--------·----·-··--·---··27
Condemnation Appraisal Handbook, Vol. 3
Schmutz, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood,
N. J ., ( 1963) -·---------------------·----·-··---·-·-------······-·--·
27
Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, Crockett,
V. 0. Young, Inc., Salt Lake City (1957) ·--·-·-- 27
Eminent Domain, Nichols, Volume 3 -------------·--·- 27
CASES:
Headly vs. Rochester
272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E. 2d 198 (1936) ···---··-·---·-···13
Miami vs. Romer
73 So. 2d 285 ( 1964 Florida) ----------··-·-----···-····-·-13
Miller vs. Manders
2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W. 2d 469 (1957) -----------·-- 13
Hamer vs. State Highway Commission
304 S.W. 2d 869 ( 1957 Mo.) ·-----··-----·----·--·---···--14
City of Carlotte vs. Spratt
(N.C. 1965), 140 S.E. 2d 341 ······-------·--··-··-···-··-·
16
111

f
Page
City of Jacksonville vs. Schumann,
Fla. 167 S. 2d 95 .................................................. 16
Keck vs. Hafley
Ky. 237 S.W. 2d 527 ............................................ 16
Pima County vs. Bilby
1960 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P. 2d 647 .......................... 16
Martin vs. Port of Seattle
Wash. 1964, 391 P. 2d 540 .................................. 16
Thornburg vs. Port of Portland
Ore. 1962, 376 P. 2d 100 ...................................... 16
Phillips vs. Postal Tel. Cable Co.
130 N.C. 513, 41 S.E. 1022 .............................. 16, 17
Chick Springs Water Company vs. State
Highway Department
1931, S.C., 157 S.E. 842 ...................................... 17
Hickman vs. City of Kansas
120, Mo. 1112 25 S.W. 225 .................................. 17
Whippoorwill Crest Co. vs. Stratford
145 Conn. 286, 141A 2d 241 ................................
Sioux City vs. Tott
244 Iowa 1285, 60 N.W. 2d 510 ..........................
vs. Grinestaff
Ky. 318 S.W. 2d 811 ............................................
Clark vs. Grand Rapids
334 Mich. 464, 55 N.W. 2d 137 ..........................
Kropitzer vs. Portland
237 Ore. 157, 390 P. 2d 356 ................................
Brown vs. Oregon Short-line Railroad
36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740 ......................................
Culmer vs. Salt Lake City
27 Utah 252, 75 Pac. 620 ....................................
lV

18
18
18
18
18
18
18

Page
Thompson vs. Nelson
2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P. 2d 720 .............................. 19
Breidert vs. Southern Pacific Co.
Calif. 1964, 394 P. 2d 719 .................................... 24
State of Idaho vs. Dunclick
286 P. 2d 1112 (1953) ........................................ 24
Village of Ridgewood vs. Sreel Investment
Corporation
28 N.J. 121, 145 A. 2d 306 .................................. 24
Hempstead vs. Salt Lake City
32 Utah 261, 90 P. 396 -················--·---·-············--·
24
Salt Lake and U. R. Co. vs. Butterfield, et. al.
46 Utah 431, 50 P. 931 ........................................ 27
Ogden Short-Line Railroad Company vs. Fox,
et. al.
28 Utah 311, 78 P. 800 ........................................ 27
Hughes vs. State of Texas
302 S.W. 2d 747 .................................................... 27
Steele vs. City of Anson
229 s.,v. 2d 948 ············--···················-··················
28
Thomas vs. Braffett's Heirs
6 Utah 2d 57, 305 Pac. 2d 507 ............................ 29
Webber vs. Salt Lake Cit_y
40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 ...................................... 29
Carter vs. Jackson
351 P. 2d 957, 10 Utah 2d 284 ............................ 29
Peterson vs. Holloway
334 P. 2d 559, 8 Utah 2d 328 .............................. 29
Charlton vs. Hackett
360' Pac 2d 176, 11 Utah 2d 389 ........................ 29
v

, IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12790

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Although denominated in Appellant's Brief as an
action in equity, this is, in fact, an action at law asserting
constitutional rights initiated by a real property owner
whose land was taken for public use by Provo City without formal condemnation proceedings and without payment for the land.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court determined that the city appropriated Respondent's land for public use when it widened
1230 North Street in 1967 and awarded judgment for
the sum the parties had stipulated represented the value
of the land taken. After a later hearing for taking evidence on the question of the city's claim that Respondent
received "special benefits" from the street widening, the
court denied any setoff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial
court affirmed.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent controverts and supplements Appellant's statement of facts as follows:
Respondent, a small family held corporation (Transcript of Trial page 107), owns land 271 feet long, having a depth of 120 feet and fronting on its longest
(north) side onto 1230 North Street in Provo, Utah
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 5, and 13). Although entirely
owned by Respondent, the land has been leased to tenants in three separate parcels (Transcript of Trial pages
60 and 61).
When acquired by Respondent in 1946, the land
consisted of an older residence surrounded by a picket
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fence at its western end and vacant land surrounded by
wire fencing on its eastern end (Transcript of Trial
pages 66 and 68). The fence lines, which correspond
with Respondent's title along the street (Transcript of
Trial pages 37, 67 and 68) , remained in place until 1959
(Transcript of Trial pages 36 and 37) on the western
parcel, and 1967 (Transcript of Trial page 49) on the
eastern parcel.
The city originally anticipated taking the north
twelve feet of Respondent's property, but later actually
appropriated thirteen feet (Transcript of Trial pages
40 and 41).
Appellant's brief erroneously stated this land was
the south thirteen feet of the graveled shoulder of the
road occupied by the power and telephone poles. In fact,
the specific land taken by Provo City is the thirteen-foot
strip of land extending southward from Respondent's
north fence, or title line, along the 271 feet it fronts on
1230 North Street; and the gravel shoulder and power
poles were north of Respondent's fences (Transcript of
Trial pages 31, 79 and 80 and Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 and
8). After the taking, Respondent was left with land 107
feet deep instead of the 120-foot depth from north to
south (Additional Testimony on Transcript of Trial
page 92).
The eastern end of 1230 North Street terminates at
the main entrance to Brigham Young University (approximately a city block east of Respondent's property),
and its terminous was (before the street was widened),
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offset northward from the B.Y.U. entrance (Plaintiff's
exhibit 3). In 1955 the city drew up a master plan for
street widening anticipating acquisition of twelve feet of
land from Respondent and other property owners on the
south side of the street to correct the misalignment and
facilitate access to B.Y.U. (Transcript of Trial pages
23, 26 and 27 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).
In October 1959 Respondent made application for
a permit to build a new commercial structure (laundromat and small restaurant) in the center of his property
(Transcript of Trial pages 39 and 72) . Although the
zoning permitted structures to extend clear to the north
property line, the City Engineer's Office informed Respondent that it would not grant a permit unless the
structure were set back twelve feet south of the deed line
(Transcript of Trial pages 38 and 39) , and that if Respondent proceeded to build out to the line without a
permit the city would stop him (Transcript of Trial
pages 69 through 73) .
In 1962 Respondent leased the corner at the west
end of its property to Standard Oil Company of California for a service station. Standard Oil Company submitted a plot plan showing the proposed construction to
the City Engineer's Office to get a building permit. Because the Standard Oil plans called for construction of
a gasoline pump island in the twelve-foot area the city
anticipated acquiring for street purposes, the permit was
denied (Transcript of Trial pages 42 and 43). The city
then required Standard Oil Company to modify their
plans and move the structures southward out of the
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twelve-foot strip in order to get a permit (Plaintiff's
Exhibits 6 and 7). This necessitated acquisition by Respondent of a right-of-way across its neighbor on the
south, and that Respondent grant Standard Oil more
land to the east of the original station plan in order to
permit easy access to customers of Standard Oil (Transcript of Trial pages 63, 64 and 65) . In the final lease
Respondent reserved to itself the right to convey the
north twelve feet of the land in anticipation of the future
street widening (Transcript of Trial pages 81, 82, 89
and 90 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 14).
The lines for the curb and guttering installed by the
tenant in connection with its construction were fixed and
surveyed by the Provo City Engineer's Office, not by
Standard Oil, as stated in Appellant's Brief (Transcript
of Trial pages 53 through 56) .
While it is true that after construction of the new
buildings, and as a result of the required set back customers of Respondent's tenants often used the thirteen
feet of land which is the subject of this litigation for the
parking of cars, Respondent asserted ownership of it and
control over it while awaiting the street widening, designating that parking was to be done at 90 degree angles
(Transcript of Trial pages 33 and 78). After the city
did the physical acts of widening the street in 1967, it
designated the area for parallel parking (Transcript of
Trial pages 100 and 101).
In the latter part of July and first part of August
1967 the city was moving toward Respondent's property
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with installation of curb, gutter, sidewalk and blacktop
street surfacing in the area of the proposed widening.
Mr. Earl informed the city respresentatives that he
would be in Idaho for a few days, and they agreed to refrain from continuing with the work across Respondent's
property until there had been a resolution of the matter
(Transcript of Trial pages 98 and 99) . 1 t was while Mr.
Earl was in the state of Idaho that the workmen for the
city completed the blacktop surfacing and curb and
gutter on the property of Respondent (Transcript of
Trial pages 96 and 99) .
Thereafter, even though the city had already negotiated with the other property owners for acquisition of
their land (Additional Testimony on Transcript of Trial
pages 36 and 44), when Mr. Earl attempted to discuss
the matter with the Mayor of Provo City, the lVIayor re·
fused to discuss it, making it clear that the city was not
going to do anything about it, and instructing Mr. Earl
that he should bring a suit (Transcript of Trial page
100).

Appellant's brief is in error in stating that the Court
found the taking to have been on or about the 1st day of
January, 1969. That date was referred to in the Court's
Memorandum Decision rendered July 14, 1971, but on
July 15, 1971 Judge Ballif corrected the obvious clerical
error (since no evidence related to that date) by an
Amendment to Memorandum Decision ruling that the
taking for public use occurred on or about August l,
1967. The Findings and Judgment both used the date of
August 1, 1967.
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The value of the land taken as determined by the
Court, was established by stipulation of the parties
(Trnscript of Trial pages 16, 17, 18, 176 and 177). Appellant offered no evidence as to its claim to benefits at
the trial except that counsel for Appellant asked Respondent's president, Mr. Frank J. Earl, if the widening
of the street didn't make the land more valuable, to which
he got a negative reply (Transcript of Trial page 126) .
After judgment was entered, the Court reopened to
take evidence on the question of benefits conferred and
severance damages (Appellant's Motion to Reopen or
for New Trial, dated August 6, 1971, and Orders dated
October 14, 1971 and November 3, 1971 and Additional
Testimony on Transcript of Trial) .
At that later hearing Appellant called three witnesses as experts on the issues (NOTE: Page references
are to the record denominated, "Additional Testimony
on Transcript of Trial") :
Ray Murdock, Provo City Commissioner with responsibility of city streets and a former service station
leasee with experience prior to 1963 of a street widening
at his service station site located elsewhere in Provo, testified he did not know the value of the benefit, but that in
his opinion Respondent was surely benefited because before the street was widened the B.Y.U. entrance constituted a traffic bottleneck that was relieved when 1230
North Street was aligned with that entrance, thus benefitting B.Y.U., Provo City and Respondent (pages 23
and 26); that this made Respondent's property more
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easily accessible (page 27); created a special benefit by
reason of more traffic in the area (page 30); and Respondent received a special benefit from installation of
curbing and blacktopping (page 33).
Mr. S. E. J acogsen, former realtor (page 34), owner of property on 1230 North Street five blocks west of
the subject property and the former representative of
Provo City, who negotiated the transactions with the
other owners of property on 1230 North Street for acquisition of the land for the widening (pages 44 and 45)
testified it was his opinion the subject property was
benefited by the street widening (page 42), but he had
made no appraisal of the subject property (page 43),
had only mulled over his memory of the area without use
of records to arrive at his opinion (page 47), considered
the benefit no different from that of other properties on
the street (page 49), and that the benefit consisted of an
increase in accessability for general flow of traffic from
Orem, west Provo and east Provo along the street, re·
sulting in a general increase in property values in the
area (page 49). He had made no studies and expressed
no opinion on the question of severance damages.
W. Ward Heal, Provo Realtor, testified that his
appraisal was only as to the market value of the land
actually taken (page 60), except that the city had at a
later date asked him to make a second appraisal relative
to the amount of benefits conferred (page 62). His opin·
ion was that there was no severance damage to the re·
maining property because the buildings had been al·
ready constructed prior to the street widening (pages
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lld and 72) . He expressly stated that the benefits that he

measured in making his appraisal were the controlling of
points of access by improvements of blacktop surfacing
and curb and guttering, elimination of poor parking
areas, and that people felt safer by ingress and egress to
the property with the street improved (pages 65 and
66). Mr. Heal specifically stated that he was not asked
to testify as to "special benefits," but rather "benefits to
the property," and that he considered as a benefit the
greater number of cars who could pass the area where the
property was located as a result of the street widening
(page 67) . When asked on cross examination the
amount of the "special benefit," he stated that it would
probably be the value of the cost of installation of the
curb, gutter and sidewalk (page 68), but that his testimony was to be taken as testimony as to the total benefits, both general and special, and that he had not arrived
at any opinion of special benefits (page 75) .
Respondent's expert, Mr. Gregory E. Austin, professional real estate appraiser, testified that there were
no special benefits whatever in connection with the widening of the street (pages 81, 82 and 84), and that although in theory it would appear that the taking of 13
feet from the depth of the property should result in severance damages, such reduction in value of the remaining property could not be demonstrated by an evaluation of the real property market prices in the area (page
02).

Not only were both Appellant's and Respondent's
witnesses in agreement that there were no severance
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damages, but counsel for Appellant stipulated that there
was no severance damage (page 81).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT PROVO CITY TOOK RESPONDENT'S
LAND IN 1967 WHEN THE CITY ACTUALLY
BEGAN WORK ON THE CURB AND BLACKTOP SURFACING AND PHYSICALLY WID.
ENED THE STREET.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD
THAT RESPONDENT'S LAND WAS APPRO·
PRIATED BY PROVO CITY AND THAT RESPONDENT HAD NOT DEDICATED ITS
LAND TO THE PUBLIC USE.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO ALLOW THE CITY AN OFFSET AGAINST
THE VALUE OF THE LAND TAKEN FOR
SPECIAL BENEFITS CONFERRED ON THE
BALANCE OF THE PROPERTY BECAUSE:
(1) THERE 'VAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY
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SPECIAL BENEFITS; AND (2) IF THERE
HAD BEEN ANY SPECIAL BENEFITS, SUCI-I
BENEFITS COULD BE OFFSET ONLY
AGAINST SEVERANCE DAMAGES AND
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT PROVO CITY TOOK RESPONDENT S
LAND IN 1967 WHEN THE CITY ACTUALLY
BEGAN WORK ON THE CURB AND BLACKTOP SURFACING AND PHYSICALLY WIDENED THE STREET.
Appellant's entire argument under Point I of its
brief is built upon the premise that the trial court held
that the city took Respondent's land when it restricted it
from building to its property line. That assumption is
false. The trial court correctly held that the city appropriated Respondent's land on or about August 1, 1967
(See Amendment to Memorandum Decision dated July
15, 1971 and Findings of Fact, paragraph 3). This was
the date Provo City was involved in the actual installation of curb, guttering and blacktop surfacing along the
south side of 1230 North Street (Transcript of Trial
pages 95 through 99), and therefore the court held that
the "taking" took place when the city actually assumed
possession of the land.
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Respondent was restricted from building to its property line on the center piece of land when it applied for a
building permit in October 1959 (Transcript of Trial
pages 38, 39 and 69 through 72) . The second refusal to
permit structures in the proposed roadbed was in April
1962 when the city required Respondent's tenant, Standard Oil of California, to move its structures on the western piece back from the line (Transcript of Trial pages
43, 44, 45 and 46) . The final refusal to allow construction to the property line occurred on the eastern piece
where the Taco Bell Restaurant is now located, and although this was in 1967 and prior to the installation of
the street improvements by Provo City, the exact date
was not disclosed by the testimony (Transcript of Trial
pages 49 and 112).
If the trial court had found there was a taking when
the city refused building permits for construction to the
property line as suggested by Appellant, it would have
necessitated finding a different date for the "taking"
on each of the three parcels and interest on the damages
would have to have been computed from those separate
dates. The court made no such ruling.
While it is true that there was a discussion during
the trial between counsel for Appellant and Judge Bal·
lif on the question of a city's right to prohibit building to
the property line because of the proposed street widen·
ing (Transcript of Trial page 145), when the court
rendered its decision there was no holding that the taking
occurred at the times the city restricted Respondent
from building to its property line. In fact Judge Ballif
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found that the taking did not take place until the date
the city did the actual physical acts of widening the
streets and appropriating the land for public use.
Not one of the authorities cited by Appellant under
Point I of its brief involve in any way the rights of owners where the governmental body has gone into actual
physical possession of the land. They all relate to the
question of whether there is a taking when the governmental body merely limits an owner's use of his land in
anticipation of a future street. An examination of them
will disclose the following:
1. Section 10-9-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, concerns the authority of the municipality to establish an official map and amend it
for widening and narrowing of streets.

2. Headly vs. Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E. 2d
198 ( 1936) was a case where the land owner

claimed the mere adoption by the city of a plan
or map showing a proposed street constituted an
unconstitutional taking of his land because it
limited his use. The Court ruled there was no
taking because the city had not yet divested him
of his title, nor taken possession.
3. Miami vs. Romer, 73 So. 285 (1964 Florida)
similarly involved an action by the owner of land
against the city merely because its proposed street
plan prevented building to the property line, and
the court ruled that the mere plotting of a street
upon a city plan without anything more does not
constitute a taking of land.
4. Miller vs. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W. 2d
469 ( 1957) was a mandamus action to compel
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issuance of a building permit for construction in
the area of a proposed street as shown on the offi.
cial map of the city on the grounds lhat refusal tu
grant the permit constitued an unconstitutional
taking of land. The Court ruled that it could not
find any abuse of power by a legislative motive
to depress existing property values of property
which the city may, in the future, desire, and so .
found no unconstitutional taking at that time.
5. Hamer vs. State Highway Commission, 304
S.W. 2d 869 ( 1957 Mo.) was a case where the

land owner had been notified by the state highway commissioner of their intent to take his land
for a proposed highway and negotiated for the
right-of-way causing the owner to change his
plans for future use. Subsequently the highway
commission abandoned plans for the proposed
highway and the owner alleged the original highway plan constituted a taking and claimed damages. The court ruled that in absence of bad faith
or unreasonable delay, the acts of the highway
commission resulting in the owner's change of use
did not constitute a taking.
6. Section 20.14, American Law of Zoning, by
Anderson relates to the question of whether exercise of the power to grant building permits for
construction in the beds of planned future streets
constitutes a divesting of the owner of his land
merely because of the ref us al to grant the build·
ing permit.

Appellant asserts that the rational is that the landowner must "show some loss to himself other than the
actual property involved in the street widening project
in order to qualify himself for compensation." (Empha·
sis added.) This conclusion is in error. The rational is
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that refus al to permit construction of structures in the
roadbed of proposed streets shown on official maps is
not an unreasonable exercise of governmental power and
without more, will not constitute a taking. The authorities cited by Appellant do not address themselves to the
question of damages when the city later actually widens
the street.
If, as claimed by Appellant (and shown by the authorities it cites) Respondent could not claim there was
a "taking," when the city refused the building permits to
build in the proposed roadbed, then when was he divested of ownership, if not when the city actually moved
in and began occupancy by installing the street improvements on his land?
The facts of this case demonstrate an example of
tyranny by the municipal government. Respondent proposed to build commercial buildings conforming to the
zoning in the area of his land and sought permits to build
to his property line. The city informed him of the proposed street widening and forced him, against his will, to
set back to the line of the proposed project. The city
then delayed almost eight years before it actually physically widened the street, and then after negotiating for
acquisition of the land of other owners on the street and
actually taking possession of Respondent's land, it refused to make a just payment and would not commence
eminent domain proceedings.
This action could be appropriately characterized as
an "inverse condemnation," because the Utah statutes on
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eminent domain do not provide a procedure for plain
to initiate an action thereunder, and Respondent ha
its claim both upon the common law concepts of tresp:
and the right designated in Article I, Section 22 of
Utah Constitution:
"Private property shall not be taken or
for public use without just compensation."
(Transcript of Trial page 4 and 27 Am. Jun. 2d, E1
nent Domain, §478, p. 411.)

Where private property is taken for public purpo
by agencies having power of eminent domain unc
circumstances such that no procedure provided
statute affords an applicable or adequate remedy, 1
owner in the exercise of his constitutional rights, m
maintain an action to obtain just compensation [City
Charlotte vs. Spratt, (N.C. 1965,) 140 S.E. 2d 4i
City of Jacksonville vs. Schumann, Fla. 167 S. 2d !
Keck vs. Hafley, Ky. 237 S.W. 5271 Constitutio1
provisions prescribing compensation for the taking
damaging of property are self-executing, and the
sence of enabling legislation cannot deprive a prope1
owner of his right to such compensation (Pima Cour
vs. Bilby, 1960, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P. 2d 647; Mar
vs. Port of Seattle, 'Vash. 1964, 391 P. 2d 540; Thm
burg vs. Port of Portland, Ore. 1962, 376 P. 2d 10(

Where eminent domain statutes do not make p
vision for injured parties to commence the action,
property owner has a right to initiate an inverse cc
demnation proceeding (Phillips vs. Postal Tel. Cal
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Co., 130 N.C. 513, 41 S.E. 1022); and constitutional
provisions declaring just compensation for private prop;rty taken for public use are self-executing and an
action at law will lie to recover compensation (Chick
Springs Water Company vs. State Highway Department, 1931, S.C., 157 S.E. 842).
Also, where the eminent domain statute does not
provide the land owner the right to initiate the action,
the remedies in that statute are not exclusivr and the
owner is entitled to proceed under his constitutional
rights (Hickman vs. City of Kansas, 120, Mo. 1112 25

s.w. 225).

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD
THAT RESPONDENT'S LAND 'VAS APPROPRIATED BY PROVO CITY AND THAT RESPONDENT HAD NOT DEDICATED ITS
LAND TO THE PUBLIC USE.
Appellant's answer to the complaint alleged as an
an affirmative defense that Respondent had by its acts
dedicated the land in question to the public use. At the
trial, counsel for Appellant represented to the court that
was the only issue (Transcript of Trial page 41). The
burden of proving that allegation was upon Appellant.
Appellant totally failed to prove any dedication, and in
fact the evidence amply demonstrated there was none.
Dedication has been defined as the intentional
donation or setting aside of land by an owner for some
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r
public use (Whipporwill Crest Co. vs. Stratford, H5
Conn. 286, 141A 2d 241; Sioux City vs. Tott, 244 Iowa
1285, 60 N.W. 2d 510; Grinestaff vs. Grinestaff, Ky.
318 S.W. 2d 881; Clark vs. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich.
464, 55 N. W. 2d 137 ; and Kropitzer vs. Portland, 237
Ore. 157, 390 P. 2d 356).
"The intention of the owner to set apart the lands
for the use of the public is the foundation and life
of every dedication."
and
"The acts and declarations of the owner relied on
to establish it must be convincing and unequivo·
cal, indicating, expressly or by plain implication,
a purpose to create a right in the public to use the
land adversely to him and as of right.",
further, the
"User, in order to constitute proof of dedication,
must have been by the public, and adverse to, and
exclusive of, the use and enjoyment of the prop·
erty by the proporietors, and not a mere use by the
public under and in connection with its use by the
owners in any manner desired by them .... " (58
A.L.R. 240)
Since proof of dedication rests primarily upon
intention of the owner (Brown vs. Oregon Short-Line
Railroad, 36 Utah 257, 102 Pac. 740) and the intention
of the owner must be clearly manifest (Culmer vs. Salt
Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 75 Pac. 620), appellant was
required to show Respondent had such an intention in
order to meet the burden of this affirmative defense.
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Counsel for Appellant urges the trial court should
have presumed an intent to dedicate because Respondent's tenants had used the area in question primarily
for customer par king after the commercial buildings
were constructed and this had continued several years.
However, 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended makes it clear that public use must be in the
character of a "thoroughfare" and must be continuous
for ten years in order to raise any such presumption.
Mere use in common with the owners is not sufficient
to show a dedication (Thompson vs. Nelson, 2 Utah
2d 340, 273 P. 2d 720). Appellant introduced no
evidence whatever that the area was used as a "thoroughfare." Frank J. Earl testified that it "couldn't have
been," (Transcript of Trial pages 79 and 95) , and
Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 and 8 demonstrated that telephone
poles just outside the property line would have prevented thoroughfare travel over the subject piece. The
evidence was that after construction of Respondent's
commercial building, the land was used for access to
Respondent's buildings and for customer parking at
a ninety-degree angle to the building-in other words,
with the cars facing the building and occupying the
13-foot of land in dispute, plus a portion of the gravel
shoulder of the road (Transcript of Trial pages 33
and 78).
Further, the 10-year statutory period requisite to
the presumption had not elapsed because Respondent's
uncontroverted testimony was that the fences remained
intact along the entire property line until October of
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1959 when the fence in the center parcel was removed

to begin construction on a building. The rest of the fence
came down at later dates, and this action was commenced
in September 1968.
Not only did Appellant fail to show evidence of
intent to dedicate the land, the trial court would have
had to ignore the overwhelming evidence to the contrary
in order to make such an inf errence:
·

I. Provo City had an agreement with B.Y.U.
since 1955 to align 1230 North Street with the .
main entrance to the University by widening the '
street where Respondent's property fronted on it
(Transcript of Trial pages 24 to 29) .

2. The City adopted a master plan for the street
widening in 1956 (Transcript of Trial pages 24
to 29).
3. The city established a policy of refusing building permits for construction of buildings in the
pro_posed roadbed (Transcript of Trial pages 37
and 38).
4. In October 1959 Respondent applied to the
City Engineer's Office for a permit to construct
a building on the center piece of his land with the
front of the building extending to his property
line (Transcript of Trial pages 72 and 73).
5. The city refused the permit and informed him
the building would have to be set back from his
line and when he threatened to build to the line
without a permit his compliance with the citr's
desire was coerced by the threat that the city
would stop him (Transcript of Trial pages 72
and 73).
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6. Again in 1962 when Respondent's tenant,

Standard Oil Company of California, sought a
building permit with plans calling for a gasoline
pump island in the proposed roadbed, the City
Engineer refused the permit requiring them to
move south away from the area of the proposed
street widening (Transcript of Trial pages 43
through 46) .
7. The City Engineer's office did the actual survey work in establishing the line of the curb and
guttering at the service station (Transcript of
Trial pages 53 through 56) .
8. The use of the land was by customers of Re-

spondent's tenants and for parking (Transcript
of Trial page 95) . There was no evidence of any
other use.
9. Respondent exercised control over the manner
of parking, requiring 90 degree parking until
August 1967 when the city actually widened the
street and changed it to parellel parking (Transcript of Trial pages 33 and 78) .
10. Respondent's reservation in the service station
lease of the right to convey to the city the twelve
feet of land showed an intent to protect his ownership in that area and deal with the street widening when the city was ready (Transcript of Trial
page 80 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 14).

11. The area remained unsurfaced until the city
took possession in 1967 by installing curb and
guttering and blacktop surfacing (Transcript of
Trial page 97) .
12. The attempts by Mr. Earl to get the city to

discuss the matter and his meeting with city employees at the site when the construction of the

21

street improvements was approaching his Juno'
and the city agreement to refrain from construe.
tion on his land until there was a resolution of the
matter not only is evidence that there had been no
dedication, but also that the Commissioner of
Streets and City Engineer believed there had
been none (Transcript of Trial pages 98 and 99).
13. The later attempt by Mr. Earl to discuss the

matter with the mayor when he was told to start
his suit contradicts any intent to dedicate (Tran.
script of Trial page 100).
14. Mr. Frank J. Earl, President of Respondent

expressly testified that there was never any in'. '
tent to make a gift of the land to the public
(Transcript of Trial page 103).
Appellant takes the position that Respondent's
compliance with the city requirement that his structures
be set back out of the proposed roadbed is evidence of .
intent by Respondent to dedicate the land to the city,
but all of the evidence contradicts that contention. In
fact, Respondent's compliance was forced by the city.
There was no evidence of any oral or written declara·
tions of intent to dedicate, no evidence of acts of setting
aside the land for public use; there was no evidence
of thoroughfare travel over the land. Respondent main·
tained control over the manner of parking, and mere
use by patrons of Respondent's tenants for less than
ten years did not give rise to any presumption of dedi·
cation. There was no dedication.
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POINT III
'fHE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO ALLOW THE CITY AN OFFSET AGAINST
THE VALUE OF THE LAND TAKEN FOR
SPECIAL BENEFITS CONFERRED ON THE
BALANCE OF THE PROPERTY BECAUSE:
(1) THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY
SPECIAL BENEFITS; AND (2) IF THERE
HAD BEEN ANY SPECIAL BENEFITS, SUCH
BENEFITS COULD BE OFFSET ONLY
AGAINST SEVERANCE DAMAGES AND
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
Appellant's brief is confused in that it raises as
its Point III the question of whether the city should
have received an off set for special benefits and then
proceeds with argument to the effect that the Court
should have allowed an offset for general benefits. Although Appellant has expressed objection to the trial
court applying the Utah Eminent Domain Statute as
to the question of whether special benefits should have
been applied as an offset to the damages in this action,
it cited no authorities, neither to the trial court, nor in
its Brief on Appeal as to why the trial court should
not have applied the rules on the question of measure of
damages set forth in Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. It has been held that the
principals which affect property rights in an inverse
condemnation suit are the same as in an eminent domain
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actoin (Breidert vs. Southern Pacific Co., Calif. 1964
394 P. 2d 719).

I

The State of Utah, in handling its condemnation '
proceedings, takes the position, as evidenced by the
Attorney General for the State of Utah's Handbook
known as "The Law of Eminent Domain," that benefits
which will accrue to a condemnee for construction of
improvement on condemned land in connection with
benefits to the general public, are not special or direct
benefits to the condemnee, and cannot be considered
in reduction of damages [See also State of Idaho vs.
Dunclick, 286 P. 2d 1112 (1953)).
In Village of Ridgewood vs. Sreel Investment
Corporation, 28 N.J. 121, 145 A. 2d 306, the court ruled
that general benefits may not be considered in reduction
of damages of an individual property owner for the '
reason that:
"There is no reason why a man whose land is
taken for public improvements should be made to
contribute more for the public in common benefit
than his neighbor, whose lands are not taken, but
who is equally benefited by the improvements."
Hempstead vs. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 90
P. 397, involved a situation in which the owner of a
residence and real property located in Salt Lake City
initiated an action against the city claiming a taking
and consequential damages to his property where the
city had raised the grade of the street and sidewalk in
f rant of the property and along one side, a height rang·

24

;ng from four feet to nine feet, thus cutting off the
water for irrigating the lawn, trees and shrubbery,
, cutting off access to the lot from the front and side,
and making the property inconvenient and undesirable
for use as a dwelling, resulting in its abandonment. The
city claimed the property was benefited by reason of the
improved condition of the street; and the court, applying
' the constitutional provision that private property shall
not be damaged for public use, adopted the rule that
general benefits could not be considered by a jury in
awarding damages, and that the only proper offset, jf
any, would be special benefits. The rationale of the
court was to the effect that if general benefits could be
used by the city as an offset, it would result in not
making full compensation to the injured property
owner, since the general benefits are enjoyed by the
e ' other property owners on the same street who may not
have been injured by the installation of the improvement. Thus, something would then be withheld from
IS
the injured property owner which would be enjoyed
0
it by property not injured. The court defined as general
benefits, general increase in market value which is
1t
common to the other property owners in the area, and
made it clear that increased facilities for public travel
O
and transportation are not "special benefits," and not
a allowable as a credit.
y
g
Since the doctrine adopted in the Hempstead case
e arose out of an action initiated by the property owner
n on the basis of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Cong· stitution, it would appear to be controlling in the instant
1
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case. Moreover, it is consistent with the Utah statute
on eminent domain.
Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 a·
'
amended, states:
" ( 5) As far as practical, compensation must be
assessed for each source of damab es separately,"

and
" ( 2) If the property sought to be condemened
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the darn.
ages which will accrue to the portion not sought
to be condemned by reason of its severance from
the portion sought to be condemned and the con·
struction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."

then Subsection ( 4) provides that there will be a sepa·
rate determination as to how much the portion not
sought to be condemned will be benefited, if at all, by
the construction of the improvements proposed by the
plaintiff, and specifically states,
"If the benefit shall be equal to the damages as·
sessed under Subdivision ( 2) of this section, the
owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compen·
sation except the value of the portion taken; but
if the benefit shall be less than the damages so
assessed, the former shall be deducted from the
latter, and the remainder shall be the only dam·
ages allowed in addition to the value of the por·
ti on taken."

1
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Under the statute, benefits, if any, can only be set
off against the consequential, or severance damagei ti
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If there are no severance damages, the city is not permitted to set off any benefits.

In Salt Lake and U. R. Co. vs. Butterfield, et. al.,
46 Utah 431, 150 P. 931, this court distinguished the
difference between general and special benefits, ruling
that special benefits only may be used as setoff, and
that such special benefits cannot be set off except against
severance or consequential damages. See also, Ogden
' Short-Line Railroad Company vs. Fox, et al., 28 Utah
311, 78 P. 800.
In Just Compensation, Revised, by Henry Kaltenback, Part I, Section 2-3-4, "How Benefits Are to be
Set Off," is found the following language :
"When a benefit has once been determined,
whether it be a special benefit or a general benefit, the question remains as to how it affects the
award. There are two possibilities: ( l) that it
may be deducted from the entire award; or ( 2)
that it may be deducted only from the damages to
the remainder. A substantial number of states
permit the setoff only against damages to the remainder.''

The author states that Utah follows the second rule.
See also, Schmutz-Rams, Condemnation Appraisal
Handbook, pages 96, 97 and 98; Nichols, on Eminent
Domain, Volume 3, page 146; and Jury Instruction
Forms for Utah, compiled and edited by Judge J.
Allen Crockett, Form 90.55, at pages 181 and 182 to
the same effect .

In Hughes vs. State of Texas, 302 S.W. 2d 747,
the court ruled that where a landowner does not ask
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for damages for a decrease in value of his remaining
land by reason of the taking of the strip of his land In
question, evidence as to the enhancement of the value
of the land not taken is not admissable. Steele vs. City
of Ason, 229 S.W. 2d 948, ruled that although special
benefits is a legitimate offset to damages, it may not
be offset against the value of the land actually taken.

JOL

Rt

H

Uf

W

af
After all of the evidence was introduced, there was pr
nothing upon which the trial court could make a deter· ' to
mination of a setoff. Appellant had the burden of prov.
ing the claim for special benefits, and the amount. All
of Appellant's testimony related to general benefits.
Appellant's witnesses did not identify any special bene·
fits as defined in the cases. The city had already assessed
Respondent for the cost of curbing and blacktop sur·
facting (Plaintiff's Exhibits 9 and 15 and Transcript
of Trial pages 50 and 102).

Even if the court had concluded that some of
Appellant's witnesses' testimony identified some special
b
benefits, it could only be allowed as a seto:ff against t
an award for consequential or severance damages. There
was no evidence in the case of any severance damages.
In fact, Appellant's and Respondent's witnesses both
agreed there were none and counsel for Appellant stipu·
lated there were none. (Additional Testimony on 'Tran·
script of Trial page 81 ) .
Appellant has claimed this action was not timely
brought, but did not raise that issue to the trial court.
A statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which
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rnust be set forth in the pleadings (Rule 8 ( c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; and Thomas vs. Braffet's
Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57 305 Pac. 2d 507}.

Nevertheless, since Respondent's claim was founded
upon Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution,
Webber vs. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 is
apropos. That case held that a statute of limitations
s, provision arising out of statutory law does not apply
to rights created by the Constitution.
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CONCLUSION
This court has often expressed the principle that
in order to justify a reversal of the trial court, the
burden is upon the Appellant to affirmatively demonstrate error (Carter vs. Jackson, 351 P. 2d 957, 10
Utah 2d 284); that the reviewing court will recognize,
with deference, the advantaged position of the trial
court in making determinations of fact (Peterson vs.
Holloway, 334 P. 2d 559, 8 Utah 2d 328); and will
refrain from disturbing a trial court judgment and
findings if they are substantially supported by evidence
(Charlton vs. llackett, 360 Pac. 2d 176, 11 Utah 2d
389) · Respondent respectfully submits that Appellant
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has made no showing of error and that the evidence i
1
amply supports the judgment of the trial court and lt
should be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nu
day of May, 1972.
I

I

A. DEAN JEFFS of JEFFS AND

I

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

1

90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601
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